Last week, in between surfing Reddit and downing gallons of milk (more on this later), I happened across a post over at Uncle SPAM tackling the, ahem, ins-and-outs of the black market sex industry. Kudos to Mr. Spam for writing up a primer on the arguments for legalizing prostitution; it’s an issue that deserves more attention than it gets.
His post moved me to reflect on the kinds of fun questions that first roused me to pursue an education on the principles of liberty, and one of the earliest lessons I’d learned in that education: the necessity of protecting individual rights from encroachment by popular mores, even if (aye, especially if) such pressures are grounded in value judgments. The question of Prostitution encourages a discussion on the notion of Moral Offense, and whether that notion constitutes a legitimate (read: rights-encroaching) Harm. Can the rational person defend the prostitute’s “right” to conduct business if that business happens to “offend” the sensibilities of his or her neighbor?
If we hold any regard for individual rights whatsoever, we must contend that chief among such rights is the right of adults to make their own decisions, and the contingent right to act upon those decisions insofar as those actions leave undisturbed the rights of our neighbors. It is this freedom to choose that is held so highly within the libertarian tradition, and this essential freedom that comes under attack when the state enacts policies criminalizing contractual agreements between consenting adults. By this basic argument, it follows that the position held by most American states on the matter of prostitution is untenable by virtue of its interference in the private matters of consenting adults.
This gets us to the real question: what of prostitution’s Offense to Sensibilities? After all, there are those that defend their “right” to live in a society where they may rest their consciences, unburdened by the sneaking suspicion that someone, somewhere, is paying for a good time. Cato Institute senior fellow Roger Pilon walks us through a similar conflict in the following passage, in which he defends the individual’s right to engage in the offensive behavior of flag-burning:
“It is this fundamental principle…of equal freedom, defined classically by our rights to life, liberty, and property, that consitutes the core of the American vision and serves as well to order systematically the countless examples of those rights–from speech to religion, contract, due process, and on and on. Far from being mere value or policy choices, when rationally related, those rights reflect a moral order that transcends our contingent values and preferences. …[W]e are born free and equal, with equal moral rights to plan and live our own lives–even, by implication, when doing so offends others. Call it tolerance, call it respect: it is the mark of a free society that individuals are left free to pursue their own values, however wise or foolish, however enlightened or benighted, however pleasing or offensive to others.”1
And so it seems we’ve resolved the issue. Because that which offends is, as a matter of fact, that which offends values, the “offense defense” is flawed in its attempt to elevate values (read: tastes) to that inviolable echelon occupied by the rights to life, liberty and property. The “right to be free from moral offense” is an imagined one, and certainly does not take precedence before one’s right to live as he or she sees fit.
Of course, there is always one question we can count on to appear that we have not yet satisfactorily addressed: What about the children?
We’ll leave that one for next time.
1 Pilon, Roger. “The Right to Do Wrong.” The Libertarian Reader: Classic and Contemporary Readings from Lao-tzu to Milton Friedman. Ed. David Boaz. New York: Free, 1997. 197-201. Print.